The West must be flexible in dealing with Iran
Tehran will forswear nuclear weapons if President Obama is prepared to play ball
'From my own involvement as Britain’s permanent representative to the IAEA, I can testify to the acumen of President Rouhani' Photo: AP
8:04PM BST 09 Oct 2013
283 Comments
By his diplomacy since taking office, President Rouhani of Iran has done
enough to suggest that, after eight bleak years, the reins of government are
once more in the hands of men with whom the West can do business. Drawing a
parallel with the situation in 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev took over the
leadership of the Soviet Union would not be inappropriate. It is best not
done in the hearing of Mr Rouhani’s Iranian well-wishers, though, since they
are aware that many Russians now take a dim view of Mr Gorbachev and his
policies.
President Obama, for his part, has shown that he understands a moment of
opportunity has arrived. A negotiated settlement of the dispute over Iran’s
nuclear programme would remove the pressure to use force to knock out
nuclear facilities, with the incalculable consequences which that would
entail.
The simplest way of negotiating a solution, when talks get under way in Geneva
on Tuesday, would be to rely on the core provisions of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and on the ability of Mr Rouhani’s new
government to calculate what is in Iran’s best interest. The NPT allows Iran
to make peaceful use of nuclear technologies in return for a binding
commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons and frequent monitoring of its
facilities by international inspectors.
When it comes to evaluating the national interest, Mr Rouhani and his foreign
minister, Javad Zarif, have form. They were Britain’s interlocutors in 2003,
when the UK, France and Germany persuaded Iran to halt uranium enrichment
for two years and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). From my own involvement as Britain’s permanent representative to the
IAEA, I can testify to their acumen.
In this case, Iran’s interest is weighted towards not making nuclear weapons.
It has no need of a nuclear deterrent now that Saddam Hussein and his
nuclear ambitions are as Nineveh and Tyre. Iran cannot afford the economic
and humanitarian consequences of crossing the threshold that separates a
civilian from a military nuclear programme. Its security could be undermined
by a step that provoked one of its Arab neighbours to build an atom bomb.
I want to stress, though, a further consideration. Mr Rouhani showed in 2003,
and again last month in his statement to the UN General Assembly, that he is
far from indifferent to what the world thinks of Iran. He will know that if
Iran is to be seen as a respected participant in an international order
resting on the rule of law, his country must remain an NPT “Non-Nuclear
Weapon State”, alongside 185 other states.
During the Cold War, when deep mistrust between the US and the Soviet Union did not prevent a series of arms control agreements, the most effective guarantee that both sides would honour their word proved to be national interest, backed by rigorous verification. But there is no prospect that the US and its allies will be satisfied with an agreement which Iran has little or no interest in violating. They will want practical demonstrations – not just promises – that Iran has no intention of producing the highly enriched uranium or plutonium needed for a nuclear weapon. Fortunately, Mr Rouhani could be ready to meet them on this.
What form might such demonstrations take? Tougher safeguards would be essential, notably real-time surveillance of Iran’s uranium enrichment plants under the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. This would mean that, if Iran were to start enriching uranium above levels needed for civilian purposes, we would know almost immediately and would have time to react.
Particularly reassuring would be a reduction in the size of Iran’s enrichment capacity, and the dismantling of 3,000 centrifuges of a more efficient design than the bulk of those at Iran’s disposal.
But “roll-back” can be hard to obtain in arms control negotiations. So, as an alternative, the negotiators may have to explore whether there is some way of configuring Iran’s centrifuge cascades to lengthen the time needed to produce weapons-grade uranium or render production impossible. In addition, Iran could be asked to remove its existing stockpile of low-enriched uranium from its two enrichment plants and place it under IAEA seal, or even export it.
To obtain these derogations from the NPT norm, Western negotiators will have to offer two things. First, the progressive dismantling of the sanctions that have been imposed since 2007, especially on financial transactions and oil exports. The second is an unequivocal assurance that, after a transitional period, the US and its allies will accept Iran’s freedom to make peaceful use of nuclear technologies, including enrichment to produce fuel for reactors.
Any reluctance to provide an “end-state assurance” early on could be fatal. So it is worrying that President Obama will be under pressure from Israel and Congress to withhold it. If the President has to decide between losing this opportunity and securing an agreement that can enhance his legacy, will the choice be a “no-brainer”?