Goodbye Libya?
August 13, 2014 — Libya
is now on it’s sixth head of state since the fall of Gaddafi. The
government has been relying on local militia groups to keep itself in
nominal power, and an armed Islamist group recently declared the
creation of an ‘Islamic Emirate’. Goodbye Libya?
Armed militia groups battle one another in Libya, which looks to be turning into an Islamic state (Source - vittoare, Flickr)
Last
week, Libya’s House of Representatives (representing who, exactly, in
Libya’s fractured polity?) elected a new president. Aguila Saleh Iissa,
an independent lawmaker from the eastern town of al-Qobba, is the
country’s sixth head of state since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi.
That’s an average of one new leader every six months: not exactly a
stellar record for Libya’s post-revolutionary government. Worse, it’s
symptomatic of a broader lack of control. Without an army or effective
civil service to exert its authority, the government has been relying on
a hodgepodge of local militia groups to guard key institutions and to
keep itself in nominal power.
Unsurprisingly, this has proved an unreliable foundation on which to
construct a new state; and it’s already falling apart. In July, tensions
between rival militias in Tripoli exploded into an all-out battle for
possession of the capital’s airport. The airport is now unusable. At the
same time, in the influential eastern city of Benghazi, a radical
Islamist group was battling it out with a renegade army general.
Remains
of a burnt airplane at the Tripoli International Airport in the Libyan
capital. The airport sustained extensive damage after coming under
shellfire, which knocked out the control tower and damaged 90 percent of
planes parked there. Photo: AFP
‘Out of control,’ was The Economist‘s verdict,
and it was all too much for many of the foreigners working in Libya,
and most of the diplomatic corps – including the American embassy, who
evacuated the country in a hurry.
Since then, things have gone from bad to worse. While the fighting in
Tripoli continues, those Islamist radicals succeeded in occupying
Benghazi. And they didn’t just occupy it. Just a few days before
President Iissa was appointed, armed Islamist group Ansar al-Sharia in Libya
declared the creation of an ‘Islamic Emirate’ with Benghazi as its
capital, effectively seceding from the Libyan state – which can do
absolutely nothing about it.
There are unmistakeable echoes here of the recent establishment of
‘the Islamic State’ across northern Iraq and parts of Syria, by the
Islamist group that now calls itself by the same name. This is no
coincidence.
It’s not just that both the Islamic State (formerly known as the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) and Ansar al-Sharia have taken
advantage of weak or non-existent governance to assert their own
sovereignty, although this is certainly true. The link between the two
is even more direct. Ansar al-Sharia may not have formally pledged bay’at
(allegiance) to the Islamic State and the global caliphate it seeks to
impose, but it has done pretty much everything else – including sending
fighters to the battlefields in Iraq and Syria.
Unlike in Egypt, the radical Islamists in Libya are in the strongest position to realise their goals
Research from the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium
(TRAC) indicates that the Islamic State returned the favour, actually
sending fighters of Libyan origin – now trained and battle hardened – to
assist Ansar al-Sharia in taking Benghazi. It was shortly after this
decision was reached, on 22 July 2014, that the fighting in Benghazi
intensified.
‘Ansar al-Sharia in Libya is an important ally for the Islamic State
in expanding its presence and influence into Maghreb countries,’ said
Jasmine Opperman, a TRAC director. ‘Such an alliance will allow the
Islamic State to influence and direct the establishment of a smaller
Islamic caliphate in Libya as a first step in expanding it into the
Maghreb.’
Not all locals welcomed the new Islamic Emirate of Benghazi; many
participated in an opposition march to protest their new political
reality. But this was swiftly countered by a rally in support of the
Islamists – although this didn’t attract quite as many people. Aware of
this, the group has acted swiftly to implement its dawa (missionary) programme, which includes basic service provision and elements of welfare.
As far as armed opposition goes, this comes from former Libyan
General Khalifa Haftar and his Operation Dignity, which has divided what
remains of the Libyan army into two: those still answering to the
government, and those who support Haftar’s anti-Islamist and
anti-government initiative (described by the government in May as an attempted coup d’état).
General
Khalifa Haftar (C) holding a news conference in Abyar, a small town to
the east of Benghazi. The General heads the only armed opposition to the
new Islamic Emirate of Benghazi. Photo: Reuters
However, Haftar’s forces have so far been unable to challenge Ansar
al-Sharia’s superiority around Benghazi, and seem to have lost momentum
in the wake of the declaration of the Islamic Emirate. The general
himself was recently forced to deny that he had fled, tail between his legs, across the border to Egypt.
In some ways, the conflict in Benghazi mirrors broader struggles in
the region between Islamist groups (both those which are democratically
inclined, and those which are not) and hard-line military figures in the
mould of the dictators who were ousted during the Arab Spring. Unlike
in Egypt, however, where the military definitely has the upper hand, in
Libya it looks like the radical Islamists are in the strongest position
to realise their goals. This is bad news for Libyans hoping that the
2011 revolution would usher in a new, democratic dispensation.
The apparent disintegration of the Libyan state also raises important
questions for supporters of the European-led military intervention in
2011. Specifically, had enough been done to help Libya fill that
massive, Gaddafi-shaped hole?
Muammar al-Qaddafi. Gone but impossible to forget amid this chaos. Photo: Jeff Zelevansky/Getty Images
Had enough been done to help Libya fill that massive, Gaddafi-shaped hole?
‘The
major political agenda of the military intervention was the removal of
Gaddafi’s government, which was not accompanied by an effective
political framework that adequately considered the post-conflict
challenges facing post-Gaddafi Libya,’ said Solomon Ayele Dersso, a
senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies in Addis Ababa.
‘The lack of safeguarding, at the time, of the military intervention to
secure the large number of weapons in government military depots left
the country with diverse armed militias pursuing their own individual
agendas.’
Dersso concludes that the international community should have done
more. ‘Soon after the fall of Gaddafi, the difficult task of putting
Libya back together was largely left to the new political and military
forces and there has been a very “light” level of international
engagement. There should have been a robust international engagement
early on for reforming and rebuilding the security and justice sectors,
implementing disarmament and facilitating national dialogue and
reconciliation,’ he said.
In the absence of effective peacebuilding, Libya is fragmenting. Pity
poor President Iissa – he may be head of state, but will there even be a
Libyan state for that much longer?
Aguila
Saleh Iissa reacts after being elected as president of the newly
elected Libya’s House of Representatives at its first formal session in
Tobruk August 5, 2014. Photo: Reuters/Stringer
Photo: Reuters/Hani Amara
A
damaged building pictured after clashes between rival militias in an
area at Alswani road in Tripoli on
July 28th.
Plumes
of smoke rise in the sky after a rocket hit a fuel storage tank near
the airport road in Tripoli,
during clashes between rival militias July
28, 2014. Photo: Reuters/Hani Amara
This article was first published by the Institute for Security Studies, and is republished here with their permission.