Racism is an extreme form of xenophobia. Contrary to the popular
belief race is not just restricted on geographical difference and
describing the genetically different human phenotype, though it was a
19th century definition of race of which Africans had to face the worst
. In 21st century race has come to encompass the vast differences on
the ground of language, ethnicity, culture, history, religion and
societal affiliation.
According to the more pacifist humanitarian theorists , world is
woven with a mix of fabric that gives it its colorful contour, each
weave is different from the other and even if one was to become undone
the international fabric will fall into utter disarray. Pretty much
explains the contemporary world situation marred by innumerable civil
strife and terrorist activities.
Racism on the other hand drives the wedge deeper into these
differences and that’s one reason the lines marking one group from
another will never be blurred or cease to exist. What really drives
racism is the misplaced belief that members of a certain race share some
common characteristics which results in that group being superior or
inferior, desirable or detestable
10) India
Should I or should I not? But prior to pointing a finger at Rwandan
crisis, American and European hate crimes one needs to have a thorough
look at one’s own bloodied records. In the wake of terms like Marathi
Manoos, Bihari xenophobia and the incessant Hindu- Muslim division, add
to it the slit throat north- south superiority competition, it becomes
inevitable.
No matter how much we brag about the incredible India being secular
and racially tolerant. The underbelly is encrusted with racist horror
stories. Thus, be it the Delhi and Gujrat riots or segregation of north
east Indians not to mention the shiv sena havoc on fellow INDIANS from
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, typecasts about Africans and Europeans thus
making India a racially intolerant country.
9) Pakistan
Close at heels is the neighboring
country Pakistan. Being a Muslim majority country the only internal
rivalry that seems to infest it is that of Shia and Sunni Muslims.
However it goes deeper than that. There are constitutional safeguards to
ensure that no incident of racial discrimination is tolerated. But it’s
easier said than done. The government of Pakistan has taken no
productive steps to curb it.
Forced conversion and marriage deceit, extreme intolerance towards
blasphemy are some facets of racialism in Pakistan. While Americans are
still tolerated, people of other countries have to face the worst of it.
For years gathering support through anti-India stance has been the main
tactic of political parties in Pakistan. However, witnessing two
democratic terms the situation might tilt towards a good change.
8) Russia
Racism in Russia is often targeted towards those people who are
deemed as not being ethnically Russians. Fanatic racists are extremely
anti- Caucasians, Africans, Chinese and Jews. Migrants from these
particular races often face racial stereotyping and consequent
discrimination which sometimes culminate into hate crimes and gross
human rights violation, the apex of which is the rebel war in Chechnya
and Dagestan
Even though it is the duty of Russian government to safeguard the
right of these minorities and combat this social stigma but it only
seems to fail at it oftener than normal. It is also infamous for
violating its international obligations under the UN Convention on
Racial Discrimination.
7) Israel
Two groups that face the wrath of racial discrimination in Israel are
the Israeli Arabs and Palestinians .It stems from the history of the
state, back in the post-world war 2 years, when the whole world was
unanimously empathizing with the Jews, a state was carved for them. The
Palestinians who were the native residents became refugees in their
homeland before being unsympathetically driven out of, what now was the
news state of Israel.
While the Israel’s ‘law of return’ which calls for every Jew to be a
part of the state. It discriminates against the Palestinians; who were
born there in first place. They were brutally cut-off from their own
land by the Israelis. A few months back renowned scientist Stephen
Hawking supported the academic boycott of Israel.
6) Germany
Those who think anti-Semitic feelings died along with the Fuhrer, the
contemporary German neo-Nazi ideas could come as a rude shock. These
groups think along the very lines of Hitler himself, of a United Germany
with its glory restored. Midst the constant lash backs from the
government and United Nations, these groups have taken to underground
activities. The National Democratic Party of Germany has been accused
of tacitly propagating Neo-Nazi or Neo-Fascist leanings while many
organization face legal issues and some like Volkssozialistische
Bewegung Deutschlands/Partei der Arbeit, Action Front of National
Socialists/National Activists, Free German Workers’ Party, and
the Nationalist Front are all indefinitely banned.
5) Japan
Japan albeit boast being a racially tolerant country has no effective
restrictions on xenophobic actions, and foreign nationals to speak of.
Moreover, foreign nationals are known to have sometimes restricted from
certain services and activities. Back in the year 2005, a United Nations
report expressed deep concerns about racism in the country and that
government recognition of the depth of the problem was not satisfactory.
The report identified three groups at the bottom of the pyramidal
racial hierarchy structure: Japanese American, Brazilian Japanese and
the descendants of ‘poor’ third world countries. The refugee acceptance
record of japan is highly disappointing as well.
4) Rwanda
Rwanda and genocide are most often used in the same sentence due to
the ghastly months of April and June, 1994, an estimated 800,000
Rwandans were killed in the time span of mere 100 days. Most of the
people who were brutally murdered belonged to Tutsi ethnicity while the
perpetrators of the crime belonged to the Hutu tribe
Rwanda had witnessed Ethnic brutalities in past but this particular
event left even the native Rwandans lurching. Tension between the two
continues to exist. It’s similar to a hearth waiting for a spark and
people continue to sit on an issue on the verge of going off.
3) Australia
Almost one half of all Australians were either born overseas or had a
parent born in another country and one in five people confessed to have
faced some form of racial discrimination. In the year 2009 there was a
surge in number of hate crimes targeting specifically Indians. There
were more than a 100 reported assault incidents reported by the Indian
students out of which 23 had unmistakable racial undertones. Not to
mention the Cronulla riots of 2005 which is a beachfront suburb, there
were a series of racially driven mob confrontations. Though, the
situation has improved comparably in 2013.
2) United Kingdom
Did you know how Joker got his scars? He had different theories to
justify ‘em but what the epic villain sported in the movie was a
‘Glasgow smile’ also known as ‘Cheshire grin’. Back in the 60’s hooligan
firms were intolerant towards foreigners especially Americans which
were mockingly called the Yankees. The most common crime was to give an
alien the Cheshire Grin.
One need not forget the ghosts of apartheid which are still
prevalent. In the year 2004, 87,000 people from black or minority
community accepted to have experienced a racially motivated crime. While
92.000 white people also fell victim to racial typecasts.
1) United States of America
Racial and ethnic discrimination has become a major issue and
embarrassment for United States of America within the International
fora. African Americans, Asian Americans and Latin Americans also
European Americans are still disregarded by those who think of
themselves as native Americans ( far from the fact that the Red Indians
were the original Natives of what we now know as modern America).
Even though America maintains a tolerant outlook under an
African-American leader, ground reality is far from being a homogeneous
society, the racial tinges are inextricably infused in the American
culture and continues to occur in employment, housing, government
welfare programs , education and lending.
Who killed the French journalists in Mali, and why?
The kidnapping and killing of RFI journalists Ghislaine Dupont
and Claude Verlon in Mali has raised questions over the identities and
motives of the attackers – and what this means for Mali’s security.
By Leela JACINTO
The northern Malian town of Kidal
is without a doubt a dangerous outpost, nobody disputes that. But even
by Kidal’s fragile security standards, Saturday’s kidnapping and murder
of two French journalists in broad daylight was a shocking attack that
has raised questions about the likely identities of the assailants,
their motives and what it spells for Mali’s security.
No group has claimed responsibility for the killings of Ghislaine Dupont and Claude Verlon,
two veteran journalists from FRANCE 24’s sister station Radio France
Internationale (RFI). French investigators are currently cooperating
with their Malian counterparts in a criminal investigation launched
shortly after the brutal attack.
French officials suspect the involvement of al Qaeda’s regional arm,
AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). But in an interview with a
French radio station on Monday, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius
indicated that a number of militant groups could be responsible for the
attack.
“Right now
we aren’t sure who committed this assassination,” said Fabius. “There
are a few theories. We’re talking about AQIM, MUJAO - which has now
taken on a new form called al Mourabitounes - we’re talking about
possible dissent between group members. Currently, there are no precise
answers to these questions.”
A dizzying number of rebel and jihadist groups have been operating in
Mali since the Tuareg separatist MNLA group (National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad) declared the independence of northern Mali in
April 2012. A French military operation launched in January liberated
the territory from rebel control, but militant groups still operate in
the area.
MUJAO – which is the French acronym for the Movement for Monotheism
and Jihad in West Africa – announced its existence in October 2011, when
it described itself as a breakaway from AQIM.
More than two years later, MUJAO announced its alliance with terror
leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian militant who also broke away from
AQIM to form his own group. The new alliance is called al
Mourabitounes, according to a statement posted on jihadist chat sites in
August.
The involvement of a jihadist group is one of several hypotheses about the likely perpetrators of Saturday’s brazen attack.
“There are many options, which makes this very tragic,” said Zyad Limam, editor of Afrique Magazine, on the FRANCE 24 Debate show on Monday.
Speaking to FRANCE 24 on Tuesday, Douglas Yates from the American
University of Paris noted that, “The official version right now is that
this is the work of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. That hypothesis is
plausible because global jihadists see this as a permanent war in which
France is an enemy. So, the French journalists of RFI are seen as the
symbols of France and reasonable targets.” Hopes of ‘scoring millions of euros’
Although the attack bears the hallmark of an al Qaeda-related group,
Yates noted that there could also have been a purely criminal intent
behind the kidnapping, which then went horribly wrong.
“The other hypothesis is that these were criminals who were going to
take two French journalists in the hope of scoring millions of euros,”
said Yates.
Kidal lies in the Sahel, a lawless border region that has
historically afforded shelter to smugglers, kidnappers, traffickers, as
well as militant groups.
Last week, French news media reported that a ransom of more than 20 million euros was paid for the release of four French hostages who were held in captivity in the Sahel for more than three years.
Western diplomats based in the region have warned that the payment of
large ransoms encourages the kidnapping of Western citizens in an
impoverished region where kidnapping is big business. Is the MNLA divided?
“The
journalists were visiting a prominent MNLA chief and were abducted just
outside his house,” noted Limam. “So there’s the real issue of the
cohesiveness of the MNLA – are they divided? Do they have rogue
members?”
The MNLA has expressed its shock over the attack and has offered to
cooperate with investigators seeking to apprehend the journalists’
killers.
But that still leaves the thorny issue of the MNLA’s continued
presence as an armed group in a country that has – theoretically at
least – returned to constitutional order following the July presidential
election.
A month before the presidential election, the MNLA signed a peace
deal with Malian authorities in Ouagadougou, the capital of neighbouring
Burkina Faso.
But according to Konare Dougoukolo, a Mali researcher based in Paris, the Ouagadougou accord has not been fully implemented.
“Now Mali is supposed to be a sovereign state looking after Kidal,”
said Dougoukolo. “The agreement in Ouagadougou required the MNLA to be
confined and to be disarmed – and that has not happened.” ‘There’s no Malian army today’
France’s perceived sensitivity to the MNLA has been viewed with suspicion by many Malians who hold the Tuareg group responsible for last year’s crisis.
The
suspicions were exacerbated during the French military operation earlier
this year when French troops entered Kidal without the Malian army
after the MNLA made it clear that the group would not surrender to their
traditional foe, the Malian military forces.
A common complaint on the streets of Bamako is that the MNLA still
controls Kidal while Malian troops stationed in Kidal are holed up “like
sardines” in their barracks.
But according to Limam of Afrique Magazine, the complaint by many
Malian citizens that the army does not control Kidal obscures another
pressing problem in the West African nation: the abysmal state of the
Malian military.
“There’s no Malian army today,” said Limam. “There is hope, but there’s no army. We still have troops loyal to Captain Sanogo.”
Captain Amadou Sanogo
(now promoted to general) was the leader of the March 22, 2012 military
coup, which ousted a democratically elected president and plunged the
country into a perfect storm of crises.
The French military operation may have brought Mali back from the
brink, but Saturday’s attack has proved that this West African nation
still has a long bumpy road to stability and reconciliation.
Will the end of M23 rebels bring peace to DR Congo?
With the DRC’s M23 rebel group announcing the end of its
rebellion, questions loom about whether an agreement can be reached with
the Congolese government, and what the terms and effects of such an
agreement would be.
By FRANCE 24
Jon FROSCH / Sarah LEDUC
With the Democratic Republic of Congo’s M23 rebel group declaring an end
to its 20-month rebellion on Tuesday, all eyes are on a potential
political solution to end the crisis in the east of the African country.
The M23 declaration that the group would disarm and demobilise troops came hours after government forces drove the fighters out of their final two strongholds, Tshanzu and Runyoni, early Tuesday morning.
Though the announcement was hailed as “a significant positive step in
the right direction” by the US special envoy to the Congo, Russell
Feingold, questions remain about the terms and ramifications of a
potential agreement between rebels and Congolese President Joseph
Kabila’s government.
For further insight, FRANCE 24 spoke with Filip Reyntjens, a
specialist in sub-Saharan African politics and law at the University of
Antwerp in Belgium.
Here are some highlights. F24: Is the declaration by the M23 rebels that their rebellion is over to be trusted, or is it just for show? FR: My impression is that it’s for real. They have
been beaten decisively on the ground, and things have changed over the
last year, and especially the last several weeks. These rebels have
admitted defeat. So I think it’s the end of M23, or at the very least in
its military form. F24: What will be the terms of the agreement between the M23 rebels and the Congolese government? FR: Well, for the moment, there is no agreement. The
M23 rebels and the Congolese authorities were negotiating in Kampala
[the capital of Uganda] up until ten days ago. The meetings didn’t
collapse, but they didn’t lead to an agreement, either. If the
negotiations start again, the terms of the debate will become quite
different. The Congolese government will now be negotiating from a much
stronger position after the military defeat of the M23. F24: What guarantee is there that the terms of any agreement
would be respected, especially given that the Congolese government did
not keep its word after the peace agreements of 2009 with prior rebel
group CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People)? FR: Firstly, we don’t know what these terms would be
exactly. At the meetings in Pretoria yesterday and today [at the summit
of the Southern African Development Community and the International
Conference on the Great Lakes Region], African leaders were meant to sit
down around a table and flesh out an agreement, but we don’t know
precisely what its content will be.
What could happen is that the rank and file of M23 will be integrated
into the Congolese army or demobilised. About 100 of them will likely
be prosecuted for war crimes by the Congolese criminal court; the
Congolese government has already published a list of those people it
considers guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Finally,
perhaps some of them will be prosecuted by the International Criminal
Court at The Hague. That would be only the very top rebels -- maximum
half a dozen -- like Bosco Ntaganda, the former head of the M23, who is
currently in custody at The Hague. F24: The chief of the rebels is asking the Congolese
government to ensure the reinsertion of former rebels into Congolese
society. How would that work in a country as big and decentralised as
DRC? FR: Reinsertion of rebels has been tried in the
past, and it has failed. Former rebel groups have been integrated and it
has only led to new rebellions. The CNDP was integrated, and that led
to the M23, which was basically part of the CNDP under another name.
They can try it again, but we all know what it means it will probably
lead to new rebellions. F24: So another rebel group will inevitably replace the M23? FR: I’m not sure. If the DRC government can
re-establish territorial control in the east, that would make a big
difference. With the threat of the M23 now gone, Congolese authorities
should maybe address other armed groups in the area, especially the FDLR
[Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda], a Hutu movement
operating on Congolese territory. That would be my first target if I
were the Congolese army and the UN. [Editor’s note: Congolese
authorities announced their intention to do so on Tuesday afternoon.] F24: What about the rebels’ allies, Rwanda and Uganda? Where do they stand? FR: We’re particularly talking about Rwanda here.
Uganda has always been only a marginal supporter of the M23. But Rwanda
has been a crucial support. Even though they denied it, everyone knew it
to be true, especially the US and the UK, key allies. Now that [US
Secretary of State] John Kerry and [British Foreign Minister] William
Hague told Rwanda to stop supporting M23 “or else”, Rwanda has ceased
its support.
It’s a problem for Rwanda, because it will now be seen by other
potential rebel movements as a bad ally. Rwanda has supported several
rebel movements in the DRC since 1993. If there is a new one coming up,
the rebels will have second thoughts about how good an ally Rwanda will
be. Moreover, Rwanda might be cut off from exploiting natural resources
in the DRC as a result of ditching the rebels
A quarter of U.S. couples sleep apart. Are they missing important health benefits?
By
Heidi Mitchell
Updated Nov. 4, 2013 7:05 p.m. ET
Is sleeping with a loved one more beneficial to your
health than sleeping alone? Heidi Mitchell joins Lunch Break to share
what the experts are saying. Photo: Getty Images.
Stolen sheets, snoring and hot
flashes are just some of the annoyances that lead a quarter of U.S.
couples to sleep apart, according to the National Sleep Foundation. But
do the benefits of sharing a bed outweigh such costs? One neurologist,
Rachel E. Salas, the assistant medical director for the Johns Hopkins
Center for Sleep, shares her expert opinion.
Safety, Warmth
People
have slept in the same bed as a family unit for millennia—mainly for
warmth and protection from predators and outsiders, says Dr. Salas, who
has studied the history of sleep.
"Back
in the cave days and even through recent history, many people didn't
bathe often or have lots of clothes, so they slept naked. Sleeping
together was essential for warmth," she says.
Then as now, she says, it is human to feel safer knowing someone is lying close beside you.
The Science of Spooning
There
have been few scientific studies on couples sleeping together. But
experts say oxytocin, the so-called love hormone, is released during
many types of touching, including cuddling. Increased oxytocin helps the
body relax, reduces blood pressure and promotes healing, Dr. Salas
says. It also results in emotional feelings related to affection,
security and love.
A recent study showed
a link between quality of sleep and couples' daytime interactions. For
men, the better the sleep a couple got, the smoother their next-day
spousal interactions, Dr. Salas says. For women, less negative
interaction with their husbands during the day led to more restful sleep
that night.
"I can't quote any studies,
but from my neurology background, I would suspect that having a person
that you are the protector for or who protects you nearby increases the
release of neurotransmitters involved with good sleep," Dr. Salas says.
Getting
quality sleep enhances a person's quality of life, Dr. Salas says.
People with sleep disorders, such as apnea, night terrors or
sleepwalking, may benefit from having a bed partner who can observe
nighttime behaviors and help with a diagnosis.
But
for some people, sleeping together could do more harm than good: "If
you wake up often from ambient noises or get hot in your sleep, keeping
your bed to yourself may be exactly what you need."
'Humans are Social Creatures'
Sleeping
apart is a relatively modern phenomenon and varies across cultures, Dr.
Salas says. "My father is from Mexico and my mom is from Texas, and
both of them slept with all of their brothers and sisters when they were
growing up," she says. If you go to other countries, whole families
still sleep together, she says. "Humans are social creatures. We want
someone nearby.
My complaint to the FBI about a stalker was regarded as an invitation to invade my privacy.
By
Jill Kelley
Nov. 5, 2013 6:46 p.m. ET
It has been a full year since federal agents
snooped through the private emails of my husband and me, setting in
motion a series of events that ultimately led to the resignations of
Central Intelligence Agency Director
David Petraeus
and Gen.
John Allen,
the commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan. The anniversary
is a somber reminder of the unintended consequences and harsh realities
that can result from unrestrained government probing into Americans'
personal communications.
More recent revelations of National Security Agency
spying suggest that the government's invasion of citizens' privacy is
increasingly common. Millions of innocent Americans should be very
concerned about Washington's massive surveillance apparatus, which seems
to know no bounds.
My family's ordeal
began when my husband,
Scott,
and I were haunted by multiple, threatening email messages from
an apparent Internet stalker. Fearing for the safety of our family, as
well as the safety of U.S. officials named in the threatening emails, we
took the advice of military leaders and reported the messages to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
We authorized the FBI to look at one threatening email we received, and only
that email, so that the FBI could identify the stalker. However, the
FBI ignored our request and violated our trust by unlawfully searching
our private emails and turning us into the targets of an intrusive
investigation without any just cause—all the while without informing us
that they had identified the email stalker as
Paula Broadwell,
who was having an affair with Mr. Petraeus. (I have never
understood why she was stalking me and my family. In any event, she was
not charged with a crime.)
Adding insult
to injury, the FBI then leaked our identities to the media and
distorted the contents of the emails it had illegally obtained, throwing
my family into a destructive media vortex.
As
a result of the government's breach of our privacy and trust, camera
crews showed up at our door and camped outside our home to question us
about false and misleading information leaked to the media from
"unnamed" government sources. Reckless speculation and innuendo about an
inappropriate relationship with Gen. Allen spread throughout the news
media, sullying my reputation and honor, to the great distress of my
family. To this day the government has not apologized for its
indefensible conduct.
I hope that my
family's story is a case study about the damage that can be caused by
the government's electronic overreach. It appears from the NSA's leaks
that the government may be trying to collect everything about everyone
and everywhere—including America's closest friends and allies—with or
without the knowledge of the White House. Unaccountable individuals
given free rein to invade people's privacy—and a government that
maintains the tools that permit them to do so—are a prescription for a
privacy disaster.
With all the current
economic, political, social and diplomatic issues facing the country, it
is understandable that many Americans seem relatively unconcerned about
intrusions on individual privacy. They shouldn't be. The unauthorized
search of my family's emails was triggered when we appealed to law
enforcement for protection. But who knows what else might set off
governmental invasion of privacy—politics or some other improper
motivation might suffice. If this could happen to us, it could happen to
you.
As painful as my experience has
been, it has motivated me to be an advocate against unwarranted spying
on personal communications, and to push for new legislation and better
enforcement of existing privacy laws. Congress should strengthen the
Privacy Act, update the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
Americans' Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and
seizures should be extended to personal communications. My husband and I
have filed a lawsuit that seeks to hold the federal government
accountable for its flagrant violation of our rights.
The
country is not safer after reading my emails. The humiliation of and
damage to my family should never have occurred. By raising public
awareness and holding the government accountable, my husband and I hope
we will help protect other innocent families from intrusive government
snooping.
The invasion of privacy that my family endured from the federal government is not unique. Nevertheless, it is un-American.
Brazilian lawmakers are set to call the head of the country's intelligence agency to Congress.
By
John Lyons
connect
Nov. 5, 2013 6:14 p.m. ET
SAO PAULO, Brazil—Brazilian lawmakers are
set to call the head of the country's intelligence agency to Congress to
explain allegations that a Brazilian spy was quietly transferred after
being discovered improperly passing intelligence information to a U.S.
official, according to a statement by the Congressional Foreign
Relations Commission.
The statement late
Tuesday said the commission expects to hold a vote Wednesday to call
the head of Brazil's Abin spy agency, Roberto Trezza, in for a hearing
on the matter.
"More surprising than the
discovery of an Abin agent having passed information to U.S. agents,
was the decision…to ignore evidence and opt to transfer the agent,"
Representative Nelson Pellegrino, who is president of the commission,
said in the statement.
The planned
hearing deepens an ongoing controversy over U.S. spying here. Earlier
this year, documents leaked by the former U.S. security contractor Edward Snowden
appeared to show that the U.S. was gathering information on Brazilian
leaders, including tracking President Dilma Rousseff's communications
patterns with other officials. As a result, Ms. Rousseff cancelled a
planned visit to the U.S., and Brazilian officials have said spying has
cast a shadow over the countries' relations.
In a twist, Brazil also admitted this week that it too had spied on foreign diplomats in Brazil.
Brazil's
O Estado newspaper reported Oct. 27 that a Brazilian agent passed
information to a U.S. agent who was seeking information about activities
along Brazil's remote border with Paraguay and Argentina. The so-called
triple frontier is a contraband corridor that has been scrutinized as a
potential hub for terrorist financing.
According
to the newspaper, the Brazilian agent was uncovered by Brazilian
counter intelligence last year. The paper said the alleged U.S.
counterpart was attached to the U.S. Embassy in Brazil, until being
transferred out of Brazil last year.
U.S. Embassy officials in Brazil didn't immediately return messages seeking comment
Why the rebellion?
The rebels say they started their rebellion because they were not
happy with the pay and conditions in the Congolese army. But Congolese
government officials and analysts say the mutiny began when the
government came under pressure to arrest Ntaganda and hand him over to
the ICC.
Given the fact that M23 is a ragtag army, and the vast 1136km distance
between Goma and Kinshasa, it is highly unlikely that the rebels can
topple the government. But they have continued to fight, sometimes
emerging victorious after battles with poorly trained and ill-equipped
soldiers. Many say the rebellion is fuelled by the presence of vast
mineral resources in eastern DR Congo, claiming the rebels want to win
control of them. What is the role of neighbouring countries?
A ceasefire that was signed earlier this year was brokered by
neighbouring countries, including Uganda, which borders DR Congo to the
west. Rwanda, accused by DR Congo of backing M23, was also involved.
Kigali denies the accusations of backing the rebels but both Kinshasa
and UN investigators insist the M23 has received support from the
Rwandan military.
Many also wonder how Ntaganda managed to cross into Rwanda and get to
the US embassy in Kigali if he did not have any help from the Rwandan
government. What is the UN peacekeeping mission doing?
The United Nation has had peacekeepers in eastern DR Congo for more
than a decade, but they have done little to pacify the region. However,
in March the Security Council approved the creation of its first-ever
“offensive” combat force to “neutralize and disarm” M23 and other
Congolese rebels and foreign-armed groups in DR Congo. In August, the
head of the United Nations peacekeeping mission ordered peacekeepers to
take the "necessary action" to protect civilians and prevent armed
groups from advancing in the North Kivu province in response to the
renewed fighting.
Three Tuareg and Arab rebel movements announce merger amid peace talks with the government.
Last Modified: 05 Nov 2013 00:24
A Tuareg uprising in northern Mali last year plunged the country into chaos [Reuters]
The three main rebel groups in northern Mali have
agreed to merge, creating a united front in an ongoing peace process
with the government. A Tuareg uprising in northern Mali last year plunged the country into
chaos, leading to a coup in the capital Bamako and the occupation of
the north by rebels. Since a French-led invasion in January to drive out the fighters,
rebel groups have been scattered and reconciliation with them is one of
the greatest challenges for President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. The three groups that merged on Monday were the National Movement for
the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the High Council for the Unity of
Azawad (HCUA) and the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA). The merger will take effect in 45 days, they said. As part of a peace deal signed with the government in Burkina Faso in June, the three groups said they would disarm. Still, the region remains unstable and last week two French radio
journalists were killed by unidentified fighters. The secretary general
of MNLA, Bilal Ag Acherif, said his group would cooperate with
authorities to find the perpetrators. On Monday, four people were killed in northern Mali after their truck
ran over a landmine, according to officials, the latest sign of
insecurity in the country. The unrest comes as UN chief Ban Ki-moon touched down in Mali late on
Monday to begin a regional tour to highlight the battle against
poverty. Ban, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim and top officials from the
African Union, African Development Bank and European Union will spend
Tuesday in Mali before travelling to Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad. Mali has produced four rebellions since independence from France in
1960. Its light-skinned Tuareg people say successive black African
governments in the capital have excluded them from power.
Rebels fighting in country's east have been accused by rights groups of widespread atrocities, including rape.
Last Modified: 05 Nov 2013 12:37
MONUSCO, the UN mission in DR Congo, now has the mandate to fight rebels when they threaten civilians [AFP]
Rebel fighters known as M23 have agreed to disarm
after suffering a number of defeats against government troops of the
Democratic Republic of Congo and UN-backed forces. Who are the M23 rebels?
The rebels are named after a peace agreement they signed with the
Congolese government on March 23, 2009 when they were fighting as part
of a group calling itself the National Congress for the Defence of the
People (CNDP). Many CNDP fighters were integrated into the Congolese
army, officially known by its French initials FARDC.
The rebels belong to the minority Tutsi ethnic group and have close
ties to the Tutsi in neighbouring Rwanda. Their rebellion began in April
2012 when they mutinied. At that time, the CNDP was led by Bosco Ntaganda
who is now at The Hague in the Netherlands where he is awaiting trial
by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes and
crimes against humanity in the north east of the country from 2002 to
2003.
The group's senior leaders include Bishop Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero
who serves as its president. General Sultani Makenga heads the
movement's military wing.
International human rights groups say M23 fighters have been
responsible for widespread war crimes, including summary executions,
rapes, and the forced recruitment of children. In March 2013, following
infighting between two M23 factions, Ntaganda turned himself in to the
United States embassy in Rwanda and was extradited to The Hague. Why the rebellion?
The rebels say they started their rebellion because they were not
happy with the pay and conditions in the Congolese army. But Congolese
government officials and analysts say the mutiny began when the
government came under pressure to arrest Ntaganda and hand him over to
the ICC.
Given the fact that M23 is a ragtag army, and the vast 1136km distance
between Goma and Kinshasa, it is highly unlikely that the rebels can
topple the government. But they have continued to fight, sometimes
emerging victorious after battles with poorly trained and ill-equipped
soldiers. Many say the rebellion is fuelled by the presence of vast
mineral resources in eastern DR Congo, claiming the rebels want to win
control of them. What is the role of neighbouring countries?
A ceasefire that was signed earlier this year was brokered by
neighbouring countries, including Uganda, which borders DR Congo to the
west. Rwanda, accused by DR Congo of backing M23, was also involved.
Kigali denies the accusations of backing the rebels but both Kinshasa
and UN investigators insist the M23 has received support from the
Rwandan military.
Many also wonder how Ntaganda managed to cross into Rwanda and get to
the US embassy in Kigali if he did not have any help from the Rwandan
government.
What is the UN peacekeeping mission doing?
The United Nation has had peacekeepers in eastern DR Congo for more
than a decade, but they have done little to pacify the region. However,
in March the Security Council approved the creation of its first-ever
“offensive” combat force to “neutralize and disarm” M23 and other
Congolese rebels and foreign-armed groups in DR Congo. In August, the
head of the United Nations peacekeeping mission ordered peacekeepers to
take the "necessary action" to protect civilians and prevent armed
groups from advancing in the North Kivu province in response to the
renewed fighting.
Africans claim ownership of the conflict.
Another development worth mentioning is that African countries and
multilateral institutions have been quite eager to play a role in the
process of solving this conflict. Or at least preventing it from
developing into an open regional war. Not only did they confront the
traditional protagonists, they also confronted each other. The
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (Kenya, the DRC and
its nine immediate neighbours) worked intensively to keep the conflict
within its existing limits, the SADC countries tried to get actively
involved (Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania have sent troops for the
FIB), the African Union also sought its own visibility and leadership.
It is an interesting development and it is not impossible that the
result will be the power balance between and within African regions
might be reformulated. The first signs of redrawing the map of African
multilateral institutions are already visible: Tanzania’s role in the
FIB led to tensions with Rwanda which put a lot of pressure on the East
African Community. Rwanda founded the Coalition of the Willing with
Uganda and Kenya, which motivated Tanzania (member of ICGLR, EAC as well
as SADC) to say that it might consider to withdrawing from the EAC.
Congo: Waiting for M24 or a real window of opportunity? – By Kris Berwouts
Posted on by AfricanArgumentsEditor
Eastern
Congo and North Kivu in particular, are currently going through an
intense and decisive period. In less than a week, the Congolese army
(FARDC) has re-conquered the towns until recently controlled by M23.
The fighting around Goma broke out on Friday October 25th a
few days after the newest round of negotiations between M23 and the
Congolese government had broken down hours before it seemed both parties
were close to signing an agreement. The talks finally collapsed after
the government refused to grant amnesty to the M23 leadership.
New clashes broke out and the FARDC successively took Kibumba,
Kiwanja, Rutshuru, and the military camps of Rumangabo and Bunagana,
bordering Uganda and Rwanda. This victory, which appeared unlikely only
weeks ago, was achieved by the Congolese army, backed up by the United
Nations Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). On African Defense Review,
Darren Olivier provides an interesting analysis of the military and logistical aspects of the attack.
Whilst I write this piece, government forces are attacking the last
areas held by the M23 rebel group in the forested hills in the east. The
political structure of M23 declared the movement wants to lay down its
arms, but that does not yet seem the case for the military wing.
Will this put an end to what appears to be an endless cycle of
conflict in eastern Congo? Most probably not. But it might remove M23 –
the youngest rebel movement led by Congolese Tutsi, designed, supported
and used by Rwanda – from the map. And that would mean, as Jason Stearns
points out on Congo Siasa, that for the first time since 1996 “an armed group allied to Rwanda is not present in the eastern Congo.” The end of a misadventure
This is not the place, nor the time, to tell the entire story of M23’s rise and fall, but a quick summary is useful.
The genesis of the movement goes back to January 2012, when Bosco
Ntaganda understood that the Congolese government was about to drop him.
There had been an International Criminal Court warrant on Bosco for
many years and after the 2011 elections there was a lot of pressure on
Kabila to deliver him as a sign of good will. Kinshasa wanted to
capitalize on this arrest to replace Bosco with a more loyal commander,
thus dismantling (at least partially) the ‘army within an army’ that the
CNDP had remained since it was integrated in to the FARDC in 2009.
Bosco returned to the maquis and was followed by a group of
officers, mostly people with a CNPD background, and since 2009, FARDC
commanders. But contrary to earlier rebel movements of this kind, M23’s
capacity to mobilize and recruit people remained low. M23 was the
product of discontent in the ranks of the Tutsi elite in North Kivu but
never managed to extend beyond that. The Banyamulenge (Tutsi from South
Kivu) kept their distance from M23 and managed to remain outside the
conflict. The same is true for the large Hutu community of North Kivu.
Due to their limited support base within Kivu’s Kinyarwanda-speaking
community, M23 lacked the clout to start a proper war, despite the
support Rwanda provided (documented by the UN Group of Experts).
It looked like M23’s main reason for existing was to obtain, through
negotiations, better positions within the army and the government.
For months their capacity to inflict harm was limited to a small area in Rutshuru, but in November, quite unexpectedly, they took Goma.
They kept it for nearly 2 weeks, and after they moving out, two
parallel processes started. The first one, commonly known as the Kampala
negotiations, led to absolutely nothing. The second was when
international reaction crystalized into the Framework Agreement of Addis Abeba in February 2013.
The most immediate consequence of the agreement was that it announced
the deployment of a UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), composed of
Malawian, South African and Tanzanian soldiers. This brigade would
“neutralize and disarm [M23], as well as other Congolese rebels and
foreign armed groups in strife-riven eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo.” And most of all, it would fundamentally change the military
power balance in the field. Even after M23 had left Goma, it remained
the most coherent, most organized and best performing military actor in
the Kivus. This was less a result of its own strength, and more a
consequence of the FARDC’s weakness. The announcement of the brigade’s
arrival created a lot of animosity in the field.
But by the time the brigade arrived, M23 had weakened itself, for two
reasons. First, the internal tensions within M23, more precisely
between Sultani Makenga, the commander in chief of the rebellion (close
to Nkunda), and Bosco, burst out into open confrontations. On top of the
traditional cleavages between the two camps (based on clans within the
Tutsi community and regional dissension between Masisi and Rutshuru) was
the strategic question of how to position the movement against the
background of the Framework Agreement and other negotiations. In March
2013, it was clear that Makenga was much more eager than Bosco to
finalise the negotiations with the government and come to some sort of
integration. Makenga won, Bosco fled to The Hague. 200 soldiers were
killed in the fighting; many more were wounded or surrendered. The M23
officers reunited around Makenga, but the movement was much weaker than
before.
The second and most important reason for M23’s decline was the fact
that Rwanda faced a more critical attitude from its most loyal
international partners. The reaction of countries such as the UK, US,
Germany, Sweden and Holland went much further than had before, and
certainly much further than Rwanda had anticipated. Measures were not
only announced but also taken, and Rwanda had to be much more discrete
and careful in its support. M23 immediately felt the difference.
The result is that M23 is today verging on military disappearance. It
tried several times in recent weeks, by grenades and mortar fire on
both Goma and Gisenyi, to create a context where Rwanda would cross the
border and intervene directly in support. Today, the Rwandan army is at
its highest state of alert on the border. But, although the possibility
of Rwandan assistance still exists, it isn’t very likely.
Are we really approaching the end of the M23 misadventure? It looks
like it. Over the past 18 months nobody has won. Not Congo, which was
once more near to imploding, during and after Goma’s fall. Rwanda
neither, which lost a lot of its traditional support in Europe and the
USA (and amongst the population of eastern Congo). The people welcome
what they consider to be a military victory, but they are, at the same
time, afraid that this might only be a short breather in an endless
cycle of violence.
But let us try to identify the new elements in recent developments –
indications that this is not just another chapter in the same old story. Not the same old story 1: The Congolese army, rising from the ashes?
The Congolese army has gone through a metamorphosis in recent months.
For many years, the FARDC was considered to be a heterogeneous,
undisciplined, badly trained amalgam of different militias. Whenever
there was a problem of armed bandits on the loose, efforts were made to
resolve it by “integrating” them into the “regular” army, and giving the
command to the one who has done most to violate human rights.
There were many reasons why the unification of the army did not
succeed. Firstly, logistics: Regrouping the militias, registering each
soldier individually, training them, re-shuffling them and deploying
them into new units, all require the use of barracks. But there are
none, or at least very few.
There is also the matter of natural resources. A large number of
armed groups (whether or not they have been integrated into the national
army) only survive economically because they have taken possession of a
mine, or some commercial concern, etc. and they are reluctant to
abandon their possession. Then there was the question of transparency
and good management, or rather the absence thereof. In fact the less
clear the army’s organisational structure, the greater opportunities
there are for those at the head of it to embezzle large sums of money.
The many international efforts to assist the Congolese authorities in
setting up a defense apparatus capable of guaranteeing the security of
the Congolese people had a disappointing impact. This was acknowledged
in a very critical report from the European Court of Auditors in September 2013.
The result was a phantom army which was more a part of the problem
than its solution. It was systematically listed among the most serious
violators of human rights. In short, it was an army that was dangerous
for everybody except the enemy.
This has, however, changed recently, becoming visible from July
onwards. It goes back to the replacement of General Gabriel Amisi aka
‘Tango Four’ by General François Olengha as Chief of staff of the army’s
land forces in November 2012. In February 2013, 115 commanding officers
from Ituri, South and North Kivu were called back to Kinshasa on the
pretext of a military seminar and kept there. All of them were
considered to be much more involved in business activities around the
army than in military operations. They were also suspected of lacking
loyalty to the national cause. Their involvement in different local
commercial, ethnic and other networks made it impossible to provide
effective leadership. The replacement of General Mayala by General
Bahuma as Commander of the military region that covers North Kivu was
also very important.
Their disappearance from the field improved a lot of practical
issues: the logistics became better organized, uniforms, arms and
ammunition were available where and when they were needed and salaries
were paid. The first successes gave a boost to the army and created a
wave of solidarity towards the army among the population, something
which was previously unheard of. Contrary to Amisi’s period of command,
the battalions formed by the Belgians and the South Africans were
deployed on the front line and made a significant difference – providing
evidence that the international efforts to reinforce the army were not
all that bad.
A Congolese army that can carry out successful operations is an
important development, but a successful reform of the security sector is
something else. The challenge will be to consolidate it in North Kivu
and to extend it to the rest of the country. The performance of the
FARDC might not be enough to give the country a disciplined and
effective army, but it is a good start. Not the same old story 2: Monusco
A similar metamorphosis was witnessed within Monusco. Since its
deployment, the UN peacekeeping mission never gave the impression that
it could fulfill its mission and protect the Congolese people. The Blue
Helmets were considered as non-proactive, with a rather vague role,
often absent at the time and place of the action, with too little
coordination between civil and military structures, too distant from the
Congolese people and heartily loathed by them.
This also changed as part of the Framework Agreement. The arrival of
the FIB and the replacement of Roger Meece by the German diplomat
Martin Kobler made a big difference. Kobler has made a big effort to be
close to the field and accessible to the Congolese population. He is
also a much better communicator than his recent predecessors.
Of course these changes wouldn’t have been possible without the Security Council’s decision on March 28th 2013 to renew and extend Monusco’s mandate to make the Framework Agreement operational.
Not the same old story 3: Rwanda closely monitored by its allies
It is clear that M23’s military force was diminished by the prompt
action of the international community, which reacted faster and sharper
than usual. Rwanda was heavily criticized by some of its most loyal
partners. In Washington, London, The Hague, Berlin and Stockholm,
immediate measures were taken to cut or suspend parts of their bilateral
support. Rwanda overplayed its hand in its M23 gamble. Even after most
of its partners lifted or alleviated the measures, it was absolutely
clear that its future moves and actions would be looked upon with great
suspicion. The traditional partners of Rwanda went way beyond its worst
fears. Not the same old story 4: Africans claim ownership of the conflict
Another development worth mentioning is that African countries and
multilateral institutions have been quite eager to play a role in the
process of solving this conflict. Or at least preventing it from
developing into an open regional war. Not only did they confront the
traditional protagonists, they also confronted each other. The
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (Kenya, the DRC and
its nine immediate neighbours) worked intensively to keep the conflict
within its existing limits, the SADC countries tried to get actively
involved (Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania have sent troops for the
FIB), the African Union also sought its own visibility and leadership.
It is an interesting development and it is not impossible that the
result will be the power balance between and within African regions
might be reformulated. The first signs of redrawing the map of African
multilateral institutions are already visible: Tanzania’s role in the
FIB led to tensions with Rwanda which put a lot of pressure on the East
African Community. Rwanda founded the Coalition of the Willing with Uganda and Kenya, which motivated Tanzania (member of ICGLR, EAC as well as SADC) to say that it might consider to withdrawing from the EAC. A window of opportunity?
You can’t summarise an event whilst still in the middle of it.
Fighting has remained intense during the last few days, but at the very
moment I am finalising this text it seems that M23’s last bastions have
been taken and the rebels have given up their insurgency
– declaring that they now want to achieve their goals through purely
political means. It is not yet clear what this means for the last round
of negotiations in Kampala.
But if the violence around M23 comes to an end, progress will have to
be made in other areas – for example on other armed groups. The FIB did
not come for M23 alone; their Terms of Reference stipulate they are
there to disarm all armed groups. Who will be next? It has been
suggested that one of the reasons Rwanda kept quiet in the last weeks is
due to guarantees it has had that the FDLR is next on the list.
Congo will have to do the rest of the homework it committed itself to in Addis Ababa:
reforming the security sector and government institutions, consolidate
the state authority in the east and prevent armed groups from
destabilizing neighbouring countries, strengthening the agenda of
reconciliation, tolerance and democratization, to make progress in the
decentralization process. Such a shopping list does not appear to be
very concrete.
If the violence in the east stops or even decreases, the focus of
attention will be brought back on to the political scene – afterall, the
M23 misadventure started after controversial elections. There is a
pervasive climate of distrust, not only between majority and opposition,
but also internally within the majority and the opposition. Kabila made
an interesting strategic move going forward: he appointed Augustin
Matata Ponyo as Prime Minister. Matata Ponyo had worked in the
international financial world and as Congo’s Minister of Finance; he had
been responsible for the macroeconomic successes in the previous
legislature. His profile is more technocratic than political. Matata
started to reform the administration, injecting bits of good governance
and installing mechanisms of control which go against the interests of
those who controlled the ship of the state before him.
Just after M23 left Goma, Kabila announced a process to increase
national cohesion. Everyone had their own understanding of what a
process of increasing national cohesion could or should look like, or
what it should even be called. Eventually des concertations nationales
were organised in September and October 2013 and a list of
recommendations were adopted. Kabila announced a new government, but it
is not clear yet what it will look like or who will lead it.
Some people fear that the PPRD barons and party apparatchiks around
Secretary-General Boshab see this as an excellent occasion to get rid of
Prime Minister Matata Ponyo. They wouldn’t be at all averse to sending
‘le petit’ into the desert as a scapegoat. We can’t exclude that a
government reshuffle will be presented as a reform, while in reality it
is the opposite – the restoration of the previous, pre-Matata regime,
with negative consequences for real reform. Kris Berwouts has, over the last 25 years, worked for a
number of different Belgian and international NGOs focused on building
peace, reconciliation, security and democratic processes. Until
recently, he was the Director of EurAc, the network of European NGOs
working for advocacy on Central Africa. He now works as an independent
expert on Central Africa.
M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo said Tuesday
they would end their insurgency, hours after the country's
communications minister declared "total victory" over the rebellion
following a final government offensive on their strongholds.
By News Wires (text)
The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo announced
Tuesday that it had achieved "total victory" over M23 rebels, but the
army declined to give immediate confirmation.
"The last elements of the M23 have abandoned their positions in
Runyonyi and Chanzu under pressure from FARDC (government forces) who
have just entered there," said the country's communications minister and
government spokesman in a text message received by AFP in Kiwanja, a
town near the fighting.
He
was referring to two hilltop positions about 80 kilometres (50 miles)
north of regional capital Goma, where dozens of rebels had dug in.
Contacted by AFP, General Lucien Bahuma, army commander in Nord Kivu
province, was more cautious, saying: "I cannot confirm that for the
moment."
Another Congolese army officer said he heard that "the M23 had scarpered".
"They burned 42 vehicles and their munitions depots, they took off in
all directions, each for himself and God for all," he said, adding that
"the fighting had lasted all night".
On Monday the UN special force in eastern DR Congo joined in direct
combat with the besieged M23 rebels, throwing its weight behind the
Congolese army's crushing assault launched late last month in a bid to
finally end the rebellion. (AFP
M23's decline raises hopes of DR Congo peace
By Moses RonoBBC Africa security correspondent
These children are now playing on a tank previously used by the rebels
Continue reading the main story
DR Congo Seeks Democracy
The
imminent defeat of DR Congo's M23 rebels is the result of shifting
military and political dynamics that are presenting the most concrete
prospects of peace in the vast, unstable central African nation for many
years.
M23 rebels in the east of the country have suffered major
military defeats in the past week, forcing their political leader
Bertrand Bisimwa to declare a ceasefire and seek a return to peace talks
in Uganda.
A defeat would send an intimidating message to at least 10
other rebel groups operating in the area, raising hopes that a lasting
peace for the mineral-rich nation may be in sight after two decades of
conflict.
Continue reading the main story
“Start Quote
The M23 was largely left to its own devices - the Rwandans just wouldn't pick up their phone calls”
Jason Stearns Congo analyst
"M23 has only been the most
active group in the east. Its defeat does not mean instant peace. It is
early days," Stephanie Wolters of the South African-based Institute of
Security Studies said.
To understand the tenuous hope of possibly ending DR Congo's
conflict, it is important to look at how M23 rebels were recently routed
from its main bases by the Congolese army, a force generally known for
its indiscipline, inefficiency and corruption.
When M23 took control of Goma - the main city in the east
with a population of one million - in November 2012, it embarrassed the
government and put pressure on the international community to act after
human rights violations emerged.
President Joseph Kabila made changes to the military hierarchy and troops fighting in the east.
In a sign that the changes might have started working, no
reports of human rights violations blamed on the Congolese army have
recently emerged, as has happened during previous operations.
These refugees in Ntamugenga are among thousands displaced by fighting
In March this year, the UN approved a new mission of 3,000
African soldiers with a mandate to fight the rebels. With the
operational support of the existing UN Mission in DR Congo (Monusco),
the new forces have used helicopters to target the rebels, allowing the
army to advance on the frontline.
Continue reading the main story
Congo and Rwanda: Neighbours from hell
April-June 1994: Genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda
June 1994: Paul Kagame's Tutsi rebels take power in Rwanda, Hutus flee into Zaire (DR Congo)
Rwanda's army enters eastern Zaire to pursue Hutu fighters
1997: Laurent Kabila's AFDL, backed by Rwanda, takes power in Kinshasa
1998: Rwanda accuses Kabila of not acting against Hutu rebels and tries to topple him, sparking five years of conflict
2003: War officially ends but Hutu and Tutsi militias continue to clash in eastern DR Congo
2008: Tutsi-led CNDP rebels take up arms, causing thousands to flee
2009: Rwanda and DR Congo agree peace deal and CNDP integrated into Congolese army
2012: Former CNDP rebels, now called M23, take up arms. Rwanda denies backing them
2013: US withdraws military aid to Rwanda, M23 on verge of defeat
It is expected that the UN
mission will soon have drones for surveillance, a development that will
offer insight into rebel movements and arms supplies.
UN investigators have accused Rwanda and Uganda of supporting
the M23. Both deny this. In what it says is a sign of goodwill that it
wants a resolution to the conflict, Kampala has been hosting talks
between Kinshasa and the M23.
Jason Stearns wrote on his Congo Siasa blog that the absence of support from Rwanda to the rebels appeared to have tipped the scales.
"The M23 was largely left to its own devices - the Rwandans
just wouldn't pick up their phone calls," he posted, quoting an M23
leader.
Ola Bello of the Cape Town-based South African Institute of
International Affairs contends that for a long time, US military aid
gave Rwanda "military and diplomatic carte blanche" in the regional
conflict.
The US has since withdrawn that military support, accusing Kigali of backing the M23 rebels, believed to use child soldiers.
"This… shift in the regional diplomatic balance of forces has
resulted in the Rwandan government's move to significantly scale back
both its covert and overt support to the M23," Mr Bello said.
It is, however, too soon to say M23 has been permanently pacified.
A new UN intervention brigade has helped the army advance against the M23
For years, Kinshasa has failed to deal with rebellions in the
east in any concerted way, partly because of the involvement of foreign
actors.
Kigali has said in the past it has sent its troops to DR
Congo specifically to hunt down the FDLR - a Hutu rebel group linked to
Rwanda genocide and which opposes Tutsi influence in the region.
Unless DR Congo moves to deal with the FDLR, there is nothing
to suggest that Rwanda would not be sucked back into the conflict, even
if it stood back on this occasion.
It has been alleged that DR Congo's army has worked with the FDLR to fight the M23.
A comprehensive political process that seeks to address a series of issues beyond the armed insurgencies may save DR Congo.
Ms Wolters said: "For years, Kinshasa has lacked the
political will to really deal with the political problems for many
different reasons. It is now up to them to decide what they want to do
with the latest victory."
Mr Bello said it was time that DR Congo acknowledged the
significance of its neighbours in seeking solutions to the conflict in
the east.
"The M23's defeat… creates the political space to include all
the conflict elements [economic motives especially] into a fulsome
process of diplomatic negotiation between the DR Congo and its eastern
neighbours and other conflict parties," he said.
For the international community, the involvement of UN troops
in direct combat may offer a model to reform peacekeeping missions to
better protect civilians caught up in unrest and actively contribute to
ending wars
Drug Trafficking Patterns to and from Eastern Africa
In the period 1995-2006, reported seizures of heroin, cannabis and
cocaine in the region covered by UNODC Eastern Africaare comparatively
few and do not reflect the extent of trafficking, availability and
growing abuse in the region. The region is attractive to international
drug trafficking syndicates as they are quick to exploit non-existent or
ineffective border (land, sea and air) controls, limited cross border
and regional cooperation as well as serious deficiencies in the criminal
justice systems. Hence, the low seizure figures are more an indication
that few resources are allocated to drug control and that international
border controls are weak than a sign that no drugs are being trafficked
through the region.
The region covered by UNODC Eastern Africa is accessible by sea to
heroin and cannabis resin producer countries in South West and South
East Asia through the ports in Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya and Tanzania.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Somalia, currently in the process of
establishing a central authority, is host to widespread illegal
transactions, including drug and arms trafficking. There are two
important international airports in the region, servicing the capitals'
of Ethiopia and Kenya, which are used as transit points for drugs. Both
airports have connections between West Africa and the heroin‑producing
countries in South West and South East Asia. There is also an increasing
use of postal and courier services for cocaine, heroin and hashish.
A review of drug seizures from 1998 to date indicates an increase in
the trafficking of heroin to eastern African countries from Pakistan,
Thailand and India. Increased seizures of heroin with Nigerian
connections bound for Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya through Ethiopia have
been noted as well. Seizures and arrest statistics show that more
Tanzanians and Mozambicans are becoming involved in the trafficking of
heroin from Pakistan and Iran.
West African syndicates, with their experience in cannabis and heroin
smuggling, are actively networking in Latin America, and are
responsible for the emergence of cocaine trafficking and abuse in
eastern Africa. As shown in graph (3), although the volume of cocaine
seized in Africa is still relatively small, the situation is changing as
trafficking groups extend their highly-organised networks. In most
countries in the ROEA region it is possible to purchase pharmaceutical
products on demand without presenting a valid prescription. Many of
these products, sometimes imported without authorization, are sold by
hawkers in street-markets.
Unfortunately, the situation has been worsening in the last 10‑15
years. In the majority of the countries in the UNODC Eastern Africa
region, control and monitoring of the national drug supply and
distribution channels, including precursors, are inefficient. This
results not only in the ineffective control of pharmaceutical products,
but also in the circulation of counterfeit medicines. Together these
pose serious health and socio‑economic problems, they undermine law
enforcement activities and confidence in public health services.
The emergence of Mandrax in the region has gone hand in hand with the
diversion of licit drugs and essential chemical precursors into the
illicit market. The control of essential chemical precursors that are
either being trafficked through the UNODC Eastern Africaregion to
countries producing cocaine and heroin or used in the illegal production
of Mandrax, is an important part of the battle against drugs in the
region. It is feared that illegal trafficking, importation and use will
continue as long as there are no effective control mechanisms in the
countries of the region.
World Bank's Corrupt Companies Blacklist Dominated By Canada
The Huffington Post Canada
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Posted: 09/18/2013
Canada has the dubious honour of being home to the largest number of firms on a World Bank blacklist of corrupt companies.
But virtually all of that can be attributed to one Canadian company
-- SNC Lavalin, the construction and engineering giant whose name is
becoming a paragon of Canadian corruption.
Of the more than 600 companies now listed as barred from doing
business with the World Bank over corruption, 117 are Canadian, the most
of any one country. And of those, 115 represent SNC-Lavalin and its
subsidiaries, the Financial Post reports.
Among the listed SNC subsidiaries are Candu Energy, which designs
CANDU nuclear reactors, and Evergreen Rapid Transit Holdings, the
SNC-Lavalin company established to build Vancouver's new Sky Train line.
The World Bank’s head of corruption investigations, James David
Fielder, told the paper the SNC subsidiaries’ inclusion was due to “a
World Bank investigation relating to the Padma Bridge project in
Bangladesh where World Bank investigators closely cooperated with the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police in an effort to promote collective action
against corruption.”
As if on cue, the RCMP on Wednesday announced charges against former
SNC executive Kevin Wallace, in conjunction with the probe into the
Padma Bridge project.
Wallace was charged with bribery of a foreign official under the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.
“In
some countries, bribes are still accepted as a necessary part of doing
business. However, bribery raises serious moral and political concerns,
undermines good governance and sustainable economic development, and
distorts the conditions of international competition,” the RCMP said in a
statement.
The World Bank is in the midst of a crackdown on corrupt companies.
It expanded its list by some 250 names in the first seven months of this
year alone, the South China Morning Post reports.
“We’re not a global policeman, but what we can do is facilitate the global conversation against corruption,” Stephen Zimmerman, director of operations at the bank’s integrity division, told the Financial Times.
After Canada’s 117 listed companies, the U.S. is in second place,
with 46 listed. That’s followed by Indonesia (43 firms) and Britain (40
firms).
Bangladesh is not the only place where SNC-Lavalin is alleged to have engaged in bribery.
The company’s former CEO, Pierre Duhaime, was arrested last year on corruption charges related to $56 million in “questionable payments” believed linked to some of the company’s overseas operations. Duhaime was arrested again earlier this year
in connection with allegations of corruption surrounding a contract to
build a new facility for the McGill University Health Centre (MUHC) in
Montreal.
SNC-Lavalin’s links to the former Gadhafi regime in Libya are said to have been so close that the company offered one of the dictator’s sons a vice-president position in 2008, according to news reports.
SNC-Lavalin is also alleged to have been engaged in corrupt practices in Algeria.
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